The State of Utah v. Richard Anthony Nichols : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2002
The State of Utah v. Richard Anthony Nichols :
Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Jeffrey S. Gray; Mark W. Baer; Assistant Attorneys General; Mark Shurtleff; Attorney General;
Attorney for Appellee .
Samuel D. McVey; Kirton and McConkie; Attorney for Appellant .
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Utah v. Nichols, No. 20020686 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2002).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/3933
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
RICHARD ANTHONY NICHOLS, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20020686-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
AN APPEAL FROM CONVICTIONS FOR FIVE COUNTS OF 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, ALL SECOND DEGREE FELONIES, IN 
VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-1801 (1999), AND ONE 
COUNT OF RACKETEERING, A SECOND DEGREE FELONY, IN 
VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-1603(3) (1999), IN THE 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH, SALT LAKE 
COUNTY, THE HONORABLE TERRY L. CHRISTIANSEN PRESIDING 
JEFFREY S. GRAY, Bar No. 5852 
MARK W. BAER, Bar No. 5440 
Assistant Attorneys General 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF, Bar No. 4666 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
PO BOX 140854 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854 
Telephone: (801) 366-0180 
SAMUEL D. McVEY 
Kirton & McConkie 
1800 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
PO Box 45120 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0120 
F»! 
Utah Cc 
r 
Attorney for Appellant Attorneys for Appellee 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
RICHARD ANTHONY NICHOLS, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20020686-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
AN APPEAL FROM CONVICTIONS FOR FIVE COUNTS OF 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, ALL SECOND DEGREE FELONIES, IN 
VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-1801 (1999), AND ONE 
COUNT OF RACKETEERING, A SECOND DEGREE FELONY, IN 
VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-1603(3) (1999), IN THE 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH, SALT LAKE 
COUNTY, THE HONORABLE TERRY L. CHRISTIANSEN PRESIDING 
JEFFREY S. GRAY, Bar No. 5852 
MARK W. BAER, Bar No. 5440 
Assistant Attorneys General 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF, Bar No. 4666 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
PO BOX 140854 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854 
Telephone: (801) 366-0180 
SAMUEL D. McVEY 
Kirton & McConkie 
1800 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
PO Box 45120 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0120 
Attorney for Appellant Attorneys for Appellee 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF CONTENTS i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES iii 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES I 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 4 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 10 
ARGUMENT 11 
I. THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN DEFENDANT'S 
CONVICTIONS 11 
A. THE EVIDENCE ESTABLISHED THAT DEFENDANT WAS PART OF THE 
FRAUDULENT SCHEME 12 
1. The Evidence Established That Defendant Participated in a Scheme 
That "Robbed Peter to Pay Paul" 12 
2. The Trial Court's Credibility Determination Is Granted Deference 15 
B. THE EVIDENCE ESTABLISHED THAT DEFENDANT MADE FALSE 
REPRESENTATIONS SUPPORTING HIS CONVICTIONS ON COUNTS 6 AND 7 16 
C. THE EVIDENCE ESTABLISHED THAT DEFENDANT MADE FALSE 
REPRESENTATIONS AND MATERIAL OMISSIONS SUPPORTING HIS 
CONVICTION ON COUNT 10 19 
i 
D. THE EVIDENCE ESTABLISHED THAT DEFENDANT MADE FALSE 
REPRESENTATIONS AND MATERIAL OMISSIONS SUPPORTING HIS 
CONVICTIONS ON COUNTS 12 AND 13 23 
1. The Evidence Supported the Trial Court Finding That Defendant 
Made Misrepresentations to and Omitted Material Facts from Paul 
Nipper 23 
2. The Evidence Supported the Trial Court Finding That Defendant 
Misrepresented Facts to Jim and Ruth Ludwig 26 
II. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT PLAINLY ERR IN QUESTIONING A 
WITNESS REGARDING MATTERS RELATED TO DEFENDANT'S 
CREDIBLITY 27 
CONCLUSION 29 
ADDENDA 
Addendum A (Utah Code Ann. § 41-3-803 and § 76-10-1801) 
ii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
STATE CASES 
Manger v. Davis, 619 P.2d 687 (Utah 1980) 13 
Oakdale Village Group v. Thong, 43 Cal.App.4th 539, 546, 50 Cal.Rptr.2d 810, 
814 (Cal. App. 1996) 14 
State v. Andreason, 2001 UT App 395, 38 P.3d 982 2 
State v. Boyatt, 854 P.2d 550 (Utah App. 1993) 27 
State v. Comer, 2002 UT App 219, 51 P.3d 55, cert, denied, 
59 P.3d 603 (Utah 2002) 21 
State v. Delaney, 869 P.2d 4 (Utah App. 1994) 20, 24 
State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1993) 2 
State v. Goodman, 763 P.2d 786 (Utah 1988) passim 
State v. Gurr, 904 P.2d 238 (Utah App. 1995) 11 
State v. Hodges, 798 P.2d 270 (Utah App. 1990) 21 
State v. Kell, 2002 UT 106, 61 P.2d 1019 2, 27 
State v. Larsen, 2002 UT App 106, 999 P.2d 1252 11,12 
State v. Layman, 1999 UT 79, 985 P.2d911 1, 11, 12 
State v. Logan, 563 P.2d 811 (Utah 1977) 23 
State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994) 21 
State v. Pliego, 1999 UT 8, 974 P.2d 279 25 
State v. Wright, 744 P.2d 315 (Utah App. 1987) 21 
iii 
STATE STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 41-3-801 to -803 (1998) 13, 14 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1603 (1999) 12 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801 (1999) passim 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (Supp. 2001) 1 
STATE RULES 
UtahR. Evid. 614 27 
iv 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
vs. 
RICHARD ANTHONY NICHOLS, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Case No. 20020686-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
* * * 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from convictions for five counts of communications fraud, all 
second degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801 (1999), and one count 
of racketeering, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1603(3) 
(1999). This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (Supp. 2001). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Was the evidence sufficient to sustain defendant's convictions for communications 
fraud and racketeering? 
Standard of Review. When reviewing a conviction from a bench trial, an appellate 
court "considers] the facts in a light most favorable to the verdict." State v. Layman, 1999 
UT 79, f 12, 985 P.2d 911. The Court "must sustain the trial court's judgment unless it is 
'against the clear weight of the evidence, or if the appellate court otherwise reaches a definite 
and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.'" State v. Goodman, 763 P.2d 786, 786 
(Utah 1988) (quoting State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987)); accord State v. 
Andreason, 2001 UT App 395, J 4 n.2, 38 P.3d 982. 
2. Did the trial court plainly err in asking questions of a witness that were directly 
related to the disputed issues? 
Standard of Review. Because defendant did not object to the trial court's examination 
of the witness, this Court reviews his claim for plain error. State v. Kell, 2002 UT 106, <[f 45, 
61 P.2d 1019. To establish plain error, defendant must show that "(0 [aln e r r o r exists; 
(ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., 
absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the 
appellant, or phrased differently, [the court's] confidence in the verdict is undermined." 
State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-3-803 (1998) and § 76-10-1801 (1999), reproduced in 
Addendum A, are relevant to a determination of this case. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
John Douglas, Michael Gent, and defendant were charged with eighteen counts of 
communications fraud and one count of racketeering for activities associated with Remember 
When, an automobile dealership in Salt Lake City. R. 1-10. Pursuant to plea agreements 
with the State, Douglas pled guilty to two counts of attempted communications fraud and 
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Gent pled guilty to two counts of communications fraud, one of which was held in abeyance. 
R. 203: 307; R. 204: 456. Defendant challenged the charges. 
At the preliminary hearing, the magistrate dismissed four counts of communications 
fraud on motion of the State. R. 200: 6; R. 201: 196. The magistrate bound defendant over 
for trial on fourteen of the remaining fifteen counts, dismissing a fifth count of 
communications fraud for lack of probable cause. R. 27-30, 200-01. The trial court 
dismissed another two counts of communications fraud at trial on motion of the State, leaving 
eleven counts of communications fraud and one count of racketeering. See R. 2-6; R. 202: 9; 
R. 204: 479. Following a three-day bench trial, the court found defendant guilty of 
racketeering (count 19) and five counts of communications fraud (counts 6,7,10,12, & 13), 
and not guilty on the remaining six counts. R. 204:472-86. Nearly two and one-half months 
later, defendant moved to arrest judgment for insufficient evidence. R. 88-155. That motion 
was denied. R. 176-84. 
Defendant was sentenced to concurrent prison terms of one-to-fifteen years on each 
count. R. 174. The prison terms were suspended and defendant was placed on probation. R. 
174. As a condition of probation, defendant was ordered to serve five days in jail and pay 
$42,400 in restitution. R. 174. Defendant timely filed a notice of appeal.1 
A Notice of Appeal does not appear in the record. However, defendant attached to 
his Docketing Statement a date-stamped copy of a notice of appeal (Aug. 22, 2002). The 
State has no reason to question the authenticity of the attachment. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
John Douglas owned Remember When, an automobile dealership in Salt Lake City 
that specialized in the sale of classic or rare cars placed on consignment. R. 203: 276, 335; 
R. 204: 451. Under the dealership's consignment agreement, the owner of a consigned car 
(consignor) paid Remember When a consignment fee in advance with the understanding that 
he or she would receive the sale proceeds 21 days after the sale. See R. 202: 135-36. In 
February 1998, Douglas hired defendant through a staffing company to sell cars on behalf of 
Remember When. R. 203: 333-34. In the course of a little more than a year, defendant sold 
approximately 40 cars. R. 203: 335, 340. In addition to a bi-weekly salary, he received 
commissions and other bonuses on the sale of the cars. R. 203: 308,334, 340. Shortly after 
being hired, defendant assumed the role of the dealership's sales manager, maintaining his 
own office. R. 202: 53,66, 85,158; R. 203: 257-59,284,290,300,376,401-02,415. There, 
he kept many of the company's consignment files. R. 203: 257-59, 300. 
CARS PLACED ON CONSIGNMENT THROUGH DEFENDANT 
Cars placed on consignment with Remember When through defendant included a 
1966 Ford Mustang, a 1975 Corvette Roadster, and a 1957 Chevy Bel Air. In May 1998, 
John Neeway placed his 1966 Ford Mustang on consignment, authorizing a sale price of 
$10,700, which he later lowered to $8,400. R. 202: 83-89, 100-01. In September 1998, 
Warren Dinter placed his 1975 Corvette Roadster on consignment, authorizing a net sales 
price of $14,500. R. 202: 40-43; R. 203: 354. And in October 1998, Paul Nipper placed his 
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father's 1957 Chevy Bel Air on consignment, authorizing defendant to sell the car for 
$22,000. R.202: 121-28. 
REMEMBER WHEN'S FINANCIAL DIFFICULTIES 
In October of that same year, Michael Gent started doing promotions and marketing 
on behalf of Remember When. R. 203: 276. He also acted as the dealership's accountant. 
R. 203: 284, 290-91, 293. By the end of the year, however, Remember When was 
experiencing financial problems, "breaking] even at best." R. 204: 462. Although some 
cars were being sold, the dealership was unable to pay all its bills. R. 204: 462. To meet his 
obligations, Douglas took out a loan. R. 204: 462. 
Then, prompted by his deteriorating health, Douglas decided to leave the dealership. 
R. 203: 277, 284; R. 204: 451-52, 457-59. In January 1999, Gent agreed to purchase the 
business from Douglas and assumed the primary role of operating the business pending 
consummation of the sale. R. 202: 85; R. 203: 277-78,284,290-93; R. 204:452-53,466-67. 
Douglas pre-signed a number of checks and left them at the dealership for Gent to use for 
business expenses. R. 204:453-54. Douglas later learned that Remember When's financial 
difficulties may have stemmed, at least in part, from the embezzlement of $27,000 by 
Michael Gent. R. 203: 347, 364,432; R. 204: 464-65. 
A SCHEME TO DEFRAUD 
In January 1999, Douglas, Gent, and defendant met to discuss the dealership's 
financial problems. R. 203: 312-13. At that meeting, the three discussed the failure to pay 
consignors and transfer titles after the cars were sold. R. 203: 312-13; R. 204: 460-61. 
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Although Remember When did not own the cars they sold, Gent, Douglas, and defendant 
decided the solution was to sell more cars and use the sale proceeds to pay for delinquent 
obligations. R. 203: 313. Although Douglas's involvement in the day-to-day operations of 
the dealership all but ceased by February 1999, Douglas, Gent, and defendant continued to 
have periodic discussions about the persistent problems in not paying consignors and failing 
to secure titles for buyers. R. 203: 278, 309-10; R. 204: 453, 460-61. 
MISREPRESENTATIONS AND OMISSIONS 
Counts 12 & 13: The Sale of Nipper's Chevy Bel Air 
On January 16, 1999, customers Jim and Ruth Ludwig met with defendant at 
Remember When and discussed the purchase of Nipper's Chevy Bel Air. R. 202: 150-52, 
163. When Mr. Ludwig inquired about the car's ownership, defendant told him that it was 
owned by Remember When, not Nipper. R.202: 152-53,171,174,176; see alsoR. 203: 
268.2 He explained that the car came from Florida, but its previous owner was gone. R. 
202: 152, 163-64, 171, 174. After taking the car for a test drive and securing the necessary 
financing, the Ludwigs purchased the car for $24,950. R. 202: 152-58, 173. 
When the license plates had still not arrived nearly 30 days later, Mr. Ludwig 
telephoned defendant because his 30-day temporary registration was about to expire. R. 202: 
160. Although defendant had not even notified Nipper of the sale, he told Ludwig that they 
were having problems with the deal in Florida and promised to send a second 30-day 
2
 Text in bold highlights misrepresentations or omissions. 
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registration sticker. R. 202: 160. Shortly thereafter, on February 17, 1999, Nipper went to 
Remember When to check on the status of his car, discovering for the first time that it had 
been sold. R. 202: 128-29,135. Defendant did not notify Nipper that the car had sold a 
month earlier, but instead told him that it had sold four days prior on February 13. R. 
202: 129-30. Defendant referred Nipper to Gent to secure payment. R. 202: 129-30, 139. 
When Nipper spoke with Gent the following day, Gent told him that the car was sold 
on January 26, 1999 but that he could not pay him that day. R. 202: 129-31,134. Despite 
repeated telephone calls and personal visits from Nipper over the next month, Gent offered 
only excuses for not forwarding Nipper the sale proceeds. R. 202: 134-39,142,148. Finally, 
in March 1999, Gent gave Nipper a $22,000 check even though both he and defendant knew 
the dealership did not have sufficient funds in the bank to cover it. R. 202: 138-39; R. 203: 
310, 313-14, 345-46. After the check bounced, Nipper filed a complaint with the Motor 
Vehicle Enforcement Division. R. 202: 166, 177. 
Counts 6 & 7: The Sale of Pinter's Corvette Roadster 
In April 1999, Albert Sanchez of Colorado telephoned defendant at Remember When 
and expressed an interest in Dinter's Corvette Roadster. R. 202: 53, 66. Defendant told 
Sanchez that the car was on consignment and that the purchase price for the car was 
approximately $14,000. R. 202: 53-54. Sanchez did not buy the car at that time, but called 
defendant later that month asking him what amount he would accept for the car in a cash 
payment. R. 202: 54-55. Although Dinter had not authorized defendant to sell the car at 
a lower price, defendant told Sanchez that he could buy the car for $12,000 if he did so 
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by Friday (April 30, 1999). R. 202: 49, 55, 58, 68; see also R. 203: 296-97. Because 
defendant would not be in town on that Friday, defendant prepared the paperwork for the sale 
and gave it to Gent. R. 203:281. 
Sanchez flew to Salt Lake City on April 30, 1999, gave Gent a $12,000 cashier's 
check, and drove the car back to Colorado. R. 202: 55-59, 68. Gent told Sanchez that they 
would send the title to the car within ten days. R. 202: 59. A few weeks later in May 1999, 
Dinter telephoned defendant to check on the status of his car before he left the country for 
two weeks. R. 202: 44. Although Sanchez had purchased the car on April 30, defendant 
told Dinter that the car had not been sold. R. 202: 44. In that same month, Sanchez 
telephoned defendant about the title to the car, which had not yet been delivered. R. 202: 59-
60. Although he had not spoken with Dinter about the sale, defendant told Sanchez that 
they were working with the owner to get the title and would send it to him within one or 
two weeks. R. 202: 60. 
When Dinter returned from his trip on June 7, 1999, he telephoned defendant in 
response to several messages left on his answering machine. R. 202: 45. Defendant told 
Dinter that the car had sold and requested that Dinter send him the title. R. 202: 45. 
However, when Dinter asked about the details of the sale, defendant responded that he 
did not know the details because someone else had sold the car. R. 202: 45. 
Dinter and Sanchez each filed complaints with law enforcement authorities. R. 202: 
47, 61-62; R. 203: 254; R. 203: 424. 
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Count 10: The Sale of Neeway's Ford Mustang 
On May 2, 1999, Dennis McClelland met with defendant about the purchase of 
Neeway's Ford Mustang. R. 202: 109-10.3 Defendant told McClelland that he could not 
purchase the car for $7,500, as was represented to him a day earlier by Gent, but he could do 
so for $8,400. R.202: 107-10,115. McClelland agreed to buy the car for that price, signed a 
contract, and gave defendant a $7,000 check, placing the balance on a credit card. R. 202: 
111-13, 116. 
Although defendant sold Neeway's car to McClelland on May 2, he telephoned 
Neeway on May 12 and told him only that someone was interested in buying the car. R. 
202: 90-91,98-99.4 Defendant asked Neeway to fax him a copy of the car's title so he could 
get "information off the title to secure documentation to sell" the car. R. 202: 91. Neeway, 
who was out of town at the time, telephoned his wife and asked her to fax defendant a copy 
of the title. R. 202: 98-99. Despite repeated attempts over the next month, Neeway was 
unable to reach anyone by telephone at Remember When to give him an update on his car. 
R. 202: 91-92, 102. Finally, on June 13, 1999, Neeway drove to Remember When only to 
discover that it had been shut down. R. 202: 92. After finding defendant and Gent in one of 
3
 The trial court found that there was "no question the sale took place on May 7 of 
1999." R. 204: 480. This finding, however, was clearly erroneous. Dennis McClelland 
testified that he purchased the car on May 2, 1999 and nothing appearing in the record on 
appeal indicates a contrary date. See R. 202: 108-13. 
4
 Although Neeway testified that, based on his diary entries, defendant contacted him 
on the 17th of May, the trial court relied on the date appearing on the faxed copy of the title 
Neeway's wife sent to defendant. R. 204: 479-80. 
9 
the offices, Neeway learned for the first time that his car had in fact been sold, but neither 
defendant nor Gent gave him the proceeds from the sale. R. 202: 92, 94, 104; R. 203: 299. 
At the suggestion of Gent, Neeway filed a complaint with the Motor Vehicle Enforcement 
Division that same day. R. 202: 93, 101. 
EPILOGUE 
On June 8, 1999, the Motor Vehicle Enforcement Division closed down Remember 
When. R. 203: 375. After finding out in November 1999 that the Corvette Roadster had 
been reported stolen, Sanchez relinquished the car to local authorities in Colorado. R. 202: 
47, 61. Six months later, Dinter recovered his car from Colorado. R. 202: 47-48. Nipper 
transferred title to his Chevy Bel Air to the Ludwigs on April 13,2001. R.202: 159-61,164; 
R. 203: 302. Neeway also eventually transferred title to his Ford Mustang to McClelland. R. 
202: 118, 144. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The evidence established that defendant actively participated in meetings with John 
Douglas and Michael Gent addressing the dealership's financial problems. Although the 
dealership did not own the consigned cars, the three decided in a January 1999 meeting to 
sell more cars and use the sale proceeds, which under agency law belonged to the consignors, 
to pay delinquent obligations. The evidence established that defendant facilitated execution 
of the fraudulent scheme, and otherwise concealed it, by misrepresenting facts in order to sell 
more cars and by withholding sale information from consignors in order to delay the payment 
after the sale. Defendant challenges the trial court's findings of misrepresentations and 
10 
omissions, arguing that the testimony of the victims and others should not be believed. 
However, these challenges fail because this Court defers to the trial court's determinations 
regarding credibility and the weight of the evidence. 
Defendant also claims that the trial court improperly questioned John Douglas. The 
law is well-settled, however, that a trial court has discretion to examine witnesses. The trial 
court's questions below were proper. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN DEFENDANT'S 
CONVICTIONS 
In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence from a bench trial, this 
Court views the facts "in a light most favorable to the verdict." State v. Layman, 1999 UT 
79,112,985 P.2d 911. The Court then "review[s] the record to see if the clear weight of the 
evidence, not including demeanor and credibility, is contrary to the verdict." State v. 
Goodman, 763 P.2d 786,787 (Utah 1988) (emphasis added); accord State v. Gurr, 904 P.2d 
238, 241 (Utah App. 1995). The Court will "sustain the trial court's judgment unless it is 
'against the clear weight of the evidence, or if the appellate court otherwise reaches a definite 
and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.'" Goodman, 763 P.2d at 786 (quoting 
State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191,193 (Utah 1987)); accord State v. Larsen, 2002 UT App 106, 
^ 10, 999 P.2d 1252. In other words, the Court will overturn a conviction only if "it is 
apparent that there is not sufficient competent evidence as to each element of the crime 
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charged for the fact-finder to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant committed 
the crime." Layman, 1999 UT 79, at t 12; accord Larsen, 2002 UT App 106, at f 10. 
A. THE EVIDENCE ESTABLISHED THAT DEFENDANT WAS PART OF THE 
FRAUDULENT SCHEME 
As a threshold matter, defendant argues that his communications fraud convictions 
should be reversed because the evidence was insufficient to establish that he was part of a 
fraudulent scheme, a necessary element of communications fraud. Aplt. Brf. at 8,13,21-22; 
see Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(1) (1999). He argues that his racketeering conviction 
should thus also be reversed because, absent a showing that he participated in any fraudulent 
scheme, the evidence is insufficient to establish that he was engaged in a pattern of unlawful 
activity. Aplt. Brf. at 18-21; see Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1603(3) (1999).5 A review of the 
record, however, reveals that the evidence was sufficient to prove defendant's complicity in 
the fraudulent scheme. 
1. The Evidence Established That Defendant Participated in a Scheme 
That "Robbed Peter to Pay Paul" 
Defendant challenges the propriety of holding him criminally liable for simply 
continuing to work for a business known to him to be struggling financially. Aplt. Brf. at 8, 
13,21 -22. Holding someone criminally liable for such conduct, he argues, was not intended 
5
 This claim is primarily treated in point I.D. of defendant's brief challenging the 
racketeering charge and in point II of his brief claiming that it is against public policy to hold 
someone criminally liable simply for continuing to work for a business known to be 
experiencing financial hardship. Aplt. Brf. at 18-22. However, it is also treated by reference 
in points LA and LB. See Aplt. Brf. at 8, 13. The State addresses these claims together. 
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by the legislature and is against public policy. Aplt. Brf. at 22. However, the evidence of 
defendant's participation in the scheme was more than a general knowledge of the financial 
problems the dealership was experiencing. 
Both Gent and Douglas testified that the three had ongoing discussions—from as early 
as December 1998 until the business was shut down—addressing how they would solve the 
dealership's financial problems in failing to pay consignors and secure titles for buyers after 
a car sale. R. 203: 309-13; R. 204: 460-61. The critical meeting occurred in January 1999. 
Gent testified that at the January meeting the three decided that the solution to their financial 
problems was to sell more cars and use the proceeds from those sales to pay for delinquent 
obligations (prior sales). R. 203: 313; see also R. 204: 463 (Douglas testifying that they 
"were all trying as a team to get everybody paid"). Although this strategy might have been 
appropriate had the cars represented inventory owned by the dealership, it was not 
appropriate where the business did not own the vehicles, but held them on consignment. 
Unlike purchasing inventory, taking possession of goods on consignment creates "an 
agency or bailment relationship between the consignor and consignee." See Manger v. 
Davis, 619 P.2d 687, 691 (Utah 1980). "The consignor, as principal retains the ownership, 
may recall the goods, and sets the sale price." Id.6 Importantly in this case, the consignee 
(dealership) does "not receive the profits of the sale," but only "receives a commission." Id. 
6
 The consignor's right to retake possession of his or her consigned vehicle is subject 
to the requirements of the Consignment Sales Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 41-3-801 to -803 
(1998), which governs the consignment of vehicles. 
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Therefore, the defendants' design to use the proceeds from consignment sales to pay for 
delinquent obligations was not permissible because the sale proceeds did not constitute 
property of the dealership, but of the consignor. The dealership held the sale proceeds as an 
agent. Simply put, "[o]ne is not permitted to rob Peter in order to pay Pau l . . . . " Oakdale 
Village Group v. Thong, 43 Cal.App.4111539, 546,50 Cal.Rptr.2d 810,814 (Cal. App. 1996). 
As noted, the testimonies of Douglas and Gent established that defendant actively 
participated in devising the plan. And as explained below, defendant helped further and 
otherwise conceal the fraudulent scheme by withholding important information and 
misrepresenting material facts. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(1) (1999) (prohibiting 
misrepresentations and material omissions made "for the purpose of executing or concealing 
the scheme or artifice"). The Consignment Sales Act requires that the consignor be notified 
of a sale within 7 days after that sale and be paid within at least 21 days. Utah Code Ann. § 
41-3-803(4) (1998). By withholding the fact of a sale from a consignor, or otherwise 
misrepresenting the fact of a sale, defendant furthered the scheme and helped conceal it. For 
each day that a consignor was not made aware of the sale, Remember When could avoid its 
payment obligation to the consignor and use the proceeds, which rightfully belonged to the 
consignor, to pay other dealership obligations. 
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In summary, the evidence was sufficient to establish that defendant was part of a 
"scheme or artifice to defraud another or to obtain from another money, property, or anything 
of value." Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(1) (1999).7 
2. The Trial Court's Credibility Determination Is Granted Deference 
Defendant also argues, however, that the trial court's finding of his complicity in the 
fraudulent scheme was nothing more than "speculation" because Michael Gent and John 
Douglas were "convicted felons" who could not be believed. 8, 19-20. Asserting that the 
trial court found neither Gent nor Douglas to be credible, defendant asks this Court to 
discount their testimony in favor of his own. Aplt. Brf at 20. Defendant overstates the trial 
court's credibility determination to which this Court grants deference. Goodman, 162> P.2d at 
787. 
Although the trial court concluded that Gent "[did] not [have] much credibility," R. 
204: 489, it did not discount his testimony entirely. For example, the court observed that 
Gent's motivation to fabricate testimony was "not [ ] extremely high" given that he already 
pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement. R. 204:489. The court also indicated that it largely 
relied on Gent's testimony where it was corroborated by other testimony. R. 204: 489. As 
acknowledged by defendant in his brief, Aplt. Brf. at 20, Douglas corroborated Gent's 
7
 Defendant reasons that he is absolved of any wrongdoing because he did not know 
that Gent had embezzled money from the dealership. See Aplt. Brf. at 20-21. It is of no 
moment, however, that he was unaware of the embezzlement. Regardless of the reason for 
the dealership's financial woes, defendants were not permitted to rob Peter to pay Paul. 
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testimony that the three had ongoing discussions addressing the dealership's failure to pay 
consignors and secure titles for buyers after a car sale. R. 204: 453,460-61. And contrary 
to defendant's claim, the trial court generally accepted Douglas's testimony as credible. In 
response to defense counsel's specific question in this regard, the court stated that although it 
had "some concern" about his testimony, "Douglas appeared credible to [the] Court." R. 
204: 489. Perhaps most significantly, the trial court found that defendant was less credible 
than Douglas, observing that there were "many more occasions where [defendant's] 
testimony was contradicted by many, many other people . . . ." R. 204: 490. 
Therefore, contrary to defendant's claim, the trial court accepted as credible the 
testimonies of both Gent and Douglas concerning the discussions the three had regarding the 
dealership's financial problems. This Court must accept that credibility determination. As 
held by the Utah Supreme Court in Goodman, the appellate court "accord[s] deference to the 
trial court's ability and opportunity to evaluate credibility and demeanor." Goodman, 763 
P.2d at 787. 
B. THE EVIDENCE ESTABLISHED THAT DEFENDANT MADE FALSE 
REPRESENTATIONS SUPPORTING HIS CONVICTIONS ON COUNTS 6 AND 7 
The evidence established and the trial court found that in September 1998, Warren 
Dinter placed his '75 Corvette Roadster on consignment with defendant, authorizing a sale 
price of $14,500, and that on April 30, 1999, Michael Gent sold Albert Sanchez the vehicle 
for $12,000. R. 202: 40-43, 55-59, 68; R. 203: 354; R. 204: 473. 
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In finding defendant guilty of counts 6 and 7, the trial court found that defendant 
misrepresented to Albert Sanchez that he was authorized to sell Warren Dinter's car to him 
for $12,000 if Sanchez paid in cash by that Friday (April 30, 1999). See R. 204: 479. The 
court likewise found that defendant misrepresented to Dinter that he would sell the car for 
$14,500, but then sold it for $12,000. See R. 204: 479. The evidence also established other 
misrepresentations, not mentioned by the trial court. For example, although Sanchez bought 
Dinter's car on April 30, 1999, Dinter testified that defendant told him that it had not yet 
been sold when Dinter asked him about it in May 1999. R. 202:44. And when Dinter finally 
learned about the sale in June 1999, defendant falsely told Dinter that he did not know the 
details of the sale because someone else had sold the car. R. 202: 45. Moreover, Sanchez 
testified that when he telephoned defendant in May about the status of the car's title, 
defendant told him he was working with the owner to get the title. R. 202: 60. Yet, he did 
not speak with Dinter until June. R. 202: 44-45. 
Defendant's challenge to the evidence, however, is not targeted at the fact or nature of 
the misrepresentations. See Aplt. Brf. at 7-12. Rather, defendant claims that the evidence 
was insufficient to establish that he was the person who made the false representations, 
suggesting instead that Michael Gent sold Sanchez the car. Aplt. Brf. at 9,11-12. Defendant 
argues that the evidence was insufficient because Sanchez never saw the person who 
negotiated the sale of Dinter's car and could not describe his "distinctive" voice. Aplt. Brf. 
at 12. While it is true that Sanchez never saw defendant, his testimony, combined with the 
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testimony of others, was sufficient to establish defendant's identity as the person who 
negotiated the sale of Dinter's car. 
Sanchez testified that the person he talked to when he first called Remember When in 
April "identified himself as sales manager Richard Nichols." R. 202: 53. Sanchez testified 
that when he asked for the sales manager in a second call later that month, the person again 
identified himself as Richard Nichols. R. 202: 55. That telephone conversation resulted in 
the negotiated deal to purchase the car for $12,000. R. 202: 55. Finally, Sanchez testified 
that after repeated attempts to speak with defendant in May about the title to the car, he spoke 
with Michael Gent who then referred him to Richard Nichols. R. 202: 59-60. 
Sanchez's testimony was corroborated by Michael Gent, who denied negotiating the 
deal with Mr. Sanchez. R. 203: 281. Gent testified that defendant had negotiated the deal 
with Mr. Sanchez, and before leaving town, defendant left him the paperwork to complete the 
transaction. R. 203: 281-82. The testimony from Sanchez, combined with that from Gent, 
was more than sufficient to establish that defendant negotiated the deal with Sanchez. And 
Sanchez's failure to describe defendant's voice does not undermine his identification. 
Indeed, although defendant contends that his voice was "distinctive," Aplt. Brf. at 12, he 
does not describe it himself and there was no testimony to that effect. 
Defendant also contends that the testimonies of Gent and Sanchez are inconsistent 
because Gent testified that he redid the paperwork after it was discovered that the original 
paperwork had mistakenly included sales tax, a detail that Sanchez did not testify about. 
Aplt. Brf. at 11-12. Although Sanchez did not mention the sales tax issue, neither was he 
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asked about it. Neither the prosecutor nor defense counsel explored the details of the 
paperwork. See R. 202: 52-69. Accordingly, there is nothing inconsistent in their 
testimonies. 
Defendant also points to his own testimony denying that he negotiated the deal with 
Sanchez. Aplt. Brf. at 12. This Court, however, will not substitute its judgment for that of 
the trial court's. As explained above, the reviewing court defers to the trial court on issues of 
credibility. See Goodman, 763 P.2d at 787. 
C. THE EVIDENCE ESTABLISHED THAT DEFENDANT MADE FALSE 
REPRESENTATIONS AND MATERIAL OMISSIONS SUPPORTING HIS 
CONVICTION ON COUNT 10 
The evidence established that on May 28, 1998, John Neeway placed his '66 Ford 
Mustang on consignment with defendant and that defendant sold the car to Dennis 
McClelland on May 2, 1999. In finding defendant guilty of count 10, the trial court found 
that when defendant telephoned Mr. Neeway on May 12,1999, he misrepresented the date of 
the sale of his car, stating only that he was working on a sale when in fact the car had been 
sold (at least) five days earlier. See R. 204: 479-80. The trial court also found that 
defendant withheld a material fact from Neeway by not advising him of the sale until June 
13,1999 when Mr. Neeway went to Remember When to check on the status of his car. See 
R. 204: 480; see also R. 202: 94. 
See n.3, infra, at p. 9. 
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The trial court's findings were supported by the testimony of Mr. Neeway. Neeway 
testified that defendant called him on May 12,1999 and simply told him that "somebody was 
interested in purchasing the vehicle" and that he needed Neeway to fax the title to him so he 
could sell it. R. 202: 90-91. Neeway maintained that defendant did not tell him that a sale 
had in fact occurred. R. 202: 91. He testified that he only learned of the sale from defendant 
after he went to Remember When on June 13, 1999—more than one month after the actual 
sale. R. 202: 92, 94, 104. Because the evidence established that defendant had in fact sold 
the car before the May 12,1999 conversation, R. 202: 111-13,116,Neeway's testimony was 
sufficient to support a finding that defendant made false representations and omitted material 
facts in perpetrating and concealing the fraudulent scheme. See State v. Delaney, 869 P.2d 4, 
7 (Utah App. 1994) (holding that the testimony of a witness consistent with the trial court's 
finding is "competent evidence" to support the trial court's finding even if it is contradicted 
by other witnesses). 
Defendant does not dispute that the statements and failure to promptly notify Neeway 
of the sale, if established as true, would constitute material misrepresentations or omissions. 
Instead, he argues that the trial court should have accepted his testimony that he spoke with 
Neeway on May 8,1999, rather than May 12,1999, and that at that time he notified Neeway 
of the sale. Aplt. Brf. at 14; see R. 203: 362-64. In other words, defendant asks this Court to 
reverse the trial court's credibility determination. 
This Court has time and again held that "[t]he trial court, as fact finder, is in the best 
position to weigh the evidence and assess witness credibility." Delaney, 869 P.2d at 6-7; 
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accord State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932,936 (Utah 1994). For this reason, even when reviewing 
the sufficiency of the evidence from a bench trial conviction, the appellate court "does not 
eliminate the traditional deference afforded the fact-finder to determine the credibility of the 
witnesses." State v. Wright, 744 P.2d 315, 317 (Utah App. 1987). The trial court has 
"considerable discretion to assign relative weight to the evidence before it" and may 
"minimize or even disregard certain evidence." State v. Hodges, 798 P.2d 270, 274 (Utah 
App. 1990); accord State v. Comer, 2002 UT App 219, | 15, 51 P.3d 55, cert denied, 59 
P.3d 603 (Utah 2002). Accordingly, when "reviewing] the record to see if the clear weight 
of the evidence is contrary to the verdict, the appellate court does "not review the trial court's 
determinations relating to demeanor and credibility. Goodman, 763 P.2d at 787. 
Because defendant's challenge to the trial court's findings pertaining to count 10 
simply attacks the trial court's credibility determination, his claim must fail. Simply put, the 
trial court believed the testimony of Mr. Neeway over that of defendant. The trial court had 
already found that defendant was not credible. The court found that defendant's denial that 
he acted as sales manager was inconsistent with Remember When documents in which 
defendant identified himself as the sales manager. R. 204:475. The court had also observed 
that defendant's testimony contradicted the testimony of Michael Gent, John Douglas, and 
"almost every victim." R. 204: 475-76. On the majority of these disputed issues, the trial 
court chose to believe the victims and co-defendants rather than defendant. See R. 204:475-
77,489-90. Against this backdrop, the trial court rejected defendant's testimony in favor of 
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Mr. Neeway *s testimony that the telephone call was placed on May 12 and that defendant did 
not notify Neeway of the sale until June 13. R. 204: 480. 
Defendant nevertheless asks this Court to reverse the trial court's credibility finding 
on the grounds that (1) Neeway testified that defendant advised him in the May telephone 
conversation that "there was a sale," and (2) Neeway stated in a letter to the Attorney 
General's Office that the telephone conversation occurred "[o]n or about May 8th." Aplt. Brf 
at 14. Defendant's argument misrepresents Neeway's testimony and ignores his explanation 
for the discrepancy in the letter. 
In asserting that Neeway testified that defendant told him "there was a sale," 
defendant only quotes a portion of Neeway's response to a question from the prosecutor, 
concealing the remainder of the response which sheds a completely different light on 
Neeway's testimony. When asked by the prosecutor what defendant told him during the 
telephone call, Neeway testified: 
That there was a sale—that somebody was interested in purchasing the 
vehicle, that he needed the information off the title to secure documentation to 
sell it. Something along that line. 
R. 202: 90-91. Thus, Neeway stopped in mid-sentence when he said that "there was a sale" 
and rephrased his response to indicate that defendant only told him that someone was 
interested in buying his car. He later reaffirmed that defendant did not notify him of the sale 
until June 13, 1999. R. 202: 92, 94, 104. 
Defendant also points to a letter Neeway wrote to the Attorney General's Office 
indicating that Neeway called defendant "[o]n or about May 8th." Aplt. Brf. at 14. However, 
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defendant ignores and fails to advise this Court that when cross-examined about the date 
identified in the letter, Neeway explained that he "caught a couple of errors there" after 
reviewing an affidavit. R. 202: 99-100. 
In any event, the alleged contradictions in Neeway's testimony are matters 
appropriately suited for resolution by the trial court. As noted by the Supreme Court in State 
v. Logan, 563 P.2d 811 (Utah 1977), the appellate court "will [not] weigh conflicting 
evidence, the credibility of witnesses, or the weight to be given [a defendant's] testimony." 
563 P.2d at 813-14. 
D. THE EVIDENCE ESTABLISHED THAT DEFENDANT MADE FALSE 
REPRESENTATIONS AND MATERIAL OMISSIONS SUPPORTING HIS 
CONVICTIONS ON COUNTS 12 AND 13 
The evidence established and the court found that Paul Nipper placed his father's '57 
Chevy on consignment with defendant on October 14,1998 and that defendant sold the car to 
Jim Ludwig on January 16, 1999. R. 202: 121-28, 150-58, 173; R. 204: 481. 
1. The Evidence Supported the Trial Court Finding That Defendant 
Made Misrepresentations to and Omitted Material Facts from Paul 
Nipper 
In finding defendant guilty of communications fraud on count 12, the trial court found 
that when Nipper visited Remember When on February 17,1999, defendant for the first time 
notified Nipper of the sale, but misrepresented the date of the sale, indicating that the car had 
sold the previous weekend (rather than a month earlier). R. 204: 482. In addition to finding 
that defendant misrepresented the date of the sale, the trial court found that defendant's 
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month-long failure to notify Nipper of the sale constituted an omission of a material fact. R. 
204: 482. 
The trial court's findings were supported by the testimony of Paul Nipper. Nipper 
testified that after he placed his father's car on consignment, he telephoned defendant about 
every other week until February 17, 1999, and sometimes personally visited him at 
Remember When during that time period, to check on the status of his car. R. 202: 126-27. 
He testified that defendant never notified him of a sale. R. 202: 127. Nipper further testified 
that when defendant did advise him of the sale on February 17,1999, defendant told him that 
it had sold the prior weekend (on February 13, 1999). R. 202: 128-29, 132. Because the 
evidence established that defendant had in fact sold the car on January 16, 1999, Nipper's 
testimony was sufficient to support a finding that defendant made false representations and 
omitted material facts in perpetrating and concealing the fraudulent scheme. See Delaney, 
869 P.2d at 7 (holding that a witness's testimony that is consistent with the trial court's 
finding is "competent evidence" to support the trial court's finding even if it is contradicted 
by other witnesses). 
As in count 10, defendant does not dispute that the statements and failure to promptly 
notify the consignor (Nipper) of the sale, if established as true, would constitute material 
misrepresentations or omissions. Instead, he once again argues that the trial court should 
have accepted his testimony rather than the victim's. Aplt. Brf. at 16-17. As support, he 
points to an affidavit purportedly prepared by Nipper in a civil law suit and submitted with 
his motion to arrest judgment. Aplt. Brf. at 16-17. That affidavit, however, appears nowhere 
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in the record and cannot therefore be considered on appeal. See State v. Pliego, 1999 UT 8 4 
7,974 P.2d 279 (holding that appellate court's review is limited to the evidence in the record 
on appeal). 
Even if considered, the statements in the affidavit do not render the trial court's 
findings clearly erroneous. According to defendant, Nipper stated in the affidavit that he 
went to Remember When in "early March," rather than February 17, and that once there, no 
one could tell him where his car was or whether it had been sold. Aplt. Brf. at 16-17 (citing 
affidavit). Defendant argues that Nipper's trial testimony was inconsistent with his 
statements in the affidavit and that his trial testimony should have thus been rejected by the 
trial court. See Aplt. Brf. at 16-17. Contrary to defendant's claim, his testimony was not 
necessarily inconsistent with his statements in the affidavit. "[E]arly March" might very well 
be closer in time to February 17 than March 22. And even if defendant had said he did not 
know whether the car had sold, that statement would likewise constitute a misrepresentation 
because defendant himself had sold it. See R. 202: 152-54, 173. 
In any event, and as noted above, it is not for this Court to weigh credibility. This 
Court accords deference to the trial court's findings pertaining to the credibility of a witness. 
See Goodman, 763 P.2d at 787. On this issue, the court found defendant's credibility to be 
"certainly suspect" and "[did] not find any reason to challenge the credibility of Mr. Nipper," 
noting that "[tjhere [was] nothing inconsistent with his testimony." R. 204: 482. The court 
did not alter its view after considering the motion to arrest judgment. See R. 176-84. 
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2. The Evidence Supported the Trial Court Finding That Defendant 
Misrepresented Facts to Jim and Ruth Ludwig 
In finding defendant guilty of communications fraud on count 13, the trial court found 
that defendant misrepresented to Jim and Ruth Ludwig that Remember When owned 
Nipper's car. R. 204: 483. This finding was supported by the testimony of both Jim Ludwig 
and his wife Ruth Ludwig. 
On direct examination, Mr. Ludwig testified that he asked defendant where the car 
was from and who owned it. R. 202: 152. When the prosecutor asked what response 
defendant gave, Mr. Ludwig testified: "He told me that the car had come from Florida and at 
that point they owned the car." R. 202: 152. Defendant treats Mr. Ludwig's testimony as a 
direct quote, arguing that had defendant "intended to state the dealership owned the car he 
would have stated 'we' not 'they' own the car." Aplt. Brf. at 18. Read in context, however, 
Mr. Ludwig's response to the prosecutor's question does not appear to have been an attempt 
to give a direct quote, but rather a summation of the conversation. Use of "they" was also 
more likely to refer to Remember When than to the Nippers in light of Mr. Ludwig's 
testimony that defendant told him the owners were gone. See R. 202: 163. Moreover, when 
asked what he understood defendant's statement to mean, Mr. Ludwig testified that he 
"understood [defendant] to mean that Remember When owned [the car]." R. 202: 153,163. 
Mrs. Ludwig confirmed this meaning in her testimony. She testified that when her 
husband asked about the car's ownership, defendant's "exact" response was, "It is our car." 
R. 202: 174; see also R. 202: 171, 176. In other words, she used the possessive case of 
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"we"—the very word defendant claimed Mr. Ludwig would have used had defendant meant 
that Remember When owned the car. Her testimony thus strongly corroborates her 
husband's testimony that defendant represented that Remember When owned the car. 
Together, their testimony was more than sufficient to support the trial court's finding that 
defendant misrepresented the car's ownership. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT PLAINLY ERR IN QUESTIONING A 
WITNESS REGARDING MATTERS RELATED TO DEFENDANTS 
CREDIBLITY 
Defendant's last claim on appeal is frivolous. He complains generally that the trial 
court abandoned its role as an impartial adjudicator by questioning John Douglas about the 
business relationship between defendant and Michael Gent. Aplt. Brf. at 23-25. Because he 
did not object to the court questioning Douglas, he must show plain error. State v. Kell, 2002 
UT 106, If 45, 61 P.2d 1019. The law is well-settled that a trial judge "may interrogate 
witnesses, whether called by itself or by a party." Utah R. Evid. 614(b); accord State v. 
Boyatt, 854 P.2d 550, 553 (Utah App. 1993). In this case, the court questioned Douglas on a 
matter that went directly to defendant's credibility—determining whether defendant pursued 
a business relationship with someone whom defendant professed to dislike. Therefore, 
defendant has shown no error, much less obvious error. 
Defendant also argues that it was improper for the trial court to consider testimony 
about defendant's ongoing business relationship with Michael Gent, but he fails to explain 
why. See Aplt. Brf. at 24-25. Indeed, contrary to defendant's claim, defendant's willingness 
to work with Gent, both before and after the dealership closed, was highly relevant in 
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assessing defendant's credibility where he had testified that he did not like Gent and intended 
to leave the dealership because of him. See R. 203: 342. Evidence that defendant pursued a 
business relationship with Gent after Remember When closed cuts against defendant's trial 
testimony that he did not like Gent and did not want to work with him. 
Defendant further complains that the trial court did not rule on his objections during 
the following exchange: 
Court: What was Mr. Nichol's position after January of 1999 at 
Remember When? 
Douglas: It is my understanding that first of all he was the sales 
manager for Mr. Gent and then became a partner with Mr. 
Gent. 
Objection, lack of foundation and hearsay. Def. Counsel: 
Court: How did you determine that? 
Douglas: I was told by several people that were involved with the 
business and by the landlord that Mr. Nichols and Mr. 
Gent were forming some type of partnership. 
Def 
r " , Objection, same objection, Your Honor. 
Court: I'm talking before June 13th of 1999. 
Douglas: That's correct. 
R. 204: 465-66. Although the court did not expressly rule on the objections, a review of the 
foregoing exchange reveals that the court nevertheless addressed the objections by asking 
follow-up questions to establish foundation and ferret out hearsay. When the court learned 
that Douglas's testimony regarding defendant's relationship with defendant was based on 
statements from other people, it promptly changed the subject of its questioning. R. 204: 
466. In other words, the court appears to have disregarded the testimony. 
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In any event, the record indicates that the testimony challenged by defendant was not 
the basis of the trial court's finding that defendant was not credible. Elsewhere, Douglas 
testified that defendant expressed no reservations when he informed him that Gent would be 
taking over the business. R. 204:466-67. Elsewhere, the evidence established that defendant 
treated Gent as a superior. And by the testimony of Michael Gent and by defendant's own 
testimony it was established that defendant and Gent worked together in a successor business 
after Remember When closed. R. 203: 411-13, 429-31, 434-35. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirm 
defendant's convictions. 
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Addendum A 
Utah Code Ann. 8 41-3-803 (1998) 
(1) A consignor may take possession of his consigned vehicle at any time 
the consigned vehicle is in the possession of a consignee, provided that the 
consignor: 
(a) has notified the consignee in writing that he will take possession of the 
consigned vehicle; and 
(b) has paid all outstanding charges owing to the consignee that have been 
agreed to by the consignor in accordance with Subsection (2). 
(2) The agreed upon charges under Subsection (l)(b) shall be: 
(a) stated on a form designed by the department; and 
(b) included with the written consignment agreement. 
(3) A consignee who sells a consigned vehicle shall report to the consignor 
in writing the exact selling price of the consigned vehicle under either of the 
following circumstances: 
(a) the consignor and consignee agree in writing that the consignor shall 
receive a percentage of the selling price upon the sale of the vehicle; or 
(b) the consignor and consignee renegotiate in writing the selling price of 
the vehicle. 
(4) When a consignee sells a consigned vehicle: 
(a) the consignee, within seven calendar days of the date of sale, must give 
written notice to the consignor that the consigned vehicle has been sold; and 
(b) the consignee, within 21 calendar days of the date of sale, or within 15 
calendar days of receiving payment in full for the consigned vehicle, 
whichever date is earlier, shall remit the payment received to the consignor, 
unless the agreement to purchase the consigned vehicle has been rescinded 
before expiration of the 21 days. 
(5) If the agreement to purchase the consigned vehicle has for any reason 
been rescinded before the expiration of 21 calendar days of the date of sale, the 
consignee shall within five calendar days thereafter give written notice to the 
consignor that the agreement to purchase has been rescinded. 
* * * 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801 (1999) 
(1) Any person who has devised any scheme or artifice to defraud another 
or to obtain from another money, property, or anything of value by means of 
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, 
and who communicates directly or indirectly with any person by any means for 
the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme or artifice is guilty of: 
(a) a class B misdemeanor when the value of the property, money, or thing 
obtained or sought to be obtained is less than $300; 
(b) a class A misdemeanor when the value of the property, money, or thing 
obtained or sought to be obtained is or exceeds $300 but is less than $1,000; 
(c) a third degree felony when the value of the property, money, or thing 
obtained or sought to be obtained is or exceeds $ 1,000 but is less than $5,000; 
(d) a second degree felony when the value of the property, money, or thing 
obtained or sought to be obtained is or exceeds $5,000; and 
(e) a second degree felony when the object of the scheme or artifice to 
defraud is other than the obtaining of something of monetary value. 
(2) The determination of the degree of any offense under Subsection (1) 
shall be measured by the total value of all property, money, or things obtained 
or sought to be obtained by the scheme or artifice described in Subsection (1) 
except as provided in Subsection (l)(e). 
(3) Reliance on the part of any person is not a necessary element of the 
offense described in Subsection (1). 
(4) An intent on the part of the perpetrator of any offense described in 
Subsection (1) to permanently deprive any person of property, money, or thing 
of value is not a necessary element of the offense. 
(5) Each separate communication made for the purpose of executing or 
concealing a scheme or artifice described in Subsection (1) is a separate act 
and offense of communication fraud. 
(6) (a) To communicate as described in Subsection (1) means to bestow, 
convey, make known, recount, impart; to give by way of information; to talk 
over; or to transmit information. 
(b) Means of communication include but are not limited to use of the mail, 
telephone, telegraph, radio, television, newspaper, computer, and spoken and 
written communication. 
(7) A person may not be convicted under this section unless the pretenses, 
representations, promises, or material omissions made or omitted were made or 
omitted intentionally, knowingly, or with a reckless disregard for the truth. 
